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Abstract 
We studied the affordability constraints placed on acquisition programs since Better Buying 
Power was introduced by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics in 2010. This initiative can be thought of as extending programming from five years 
in the future to the full life of each acquisition program—typically in excess of 25 years—and 
discussing the full plan at Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) meetings. We discuss the 
management issues involved in carrying out this initiative, along with the results it has had. 
The most significant outcome is that it has brought Service programmers to the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense’s DAB process. Program managers now need to have their long-term 
plans approved by the programmers who verify that they fit with the long-term plans of the 
Service. While an Affordability Analysis is not a cost estimate, it cannot be any more precise 
than the numerous program cost estimates used to conduct the analysis. 
Introduction 
The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 
(USD[AT&L]) affordability initiative formally began in 2010 as part of Better Buying Power 
(BBP) and has been in place, with some modifications, ever since. Each Major Defense 
Acquisition Program (MDAP) and Major Automated Information System (MAIS) program that 
is reviewed by the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) is required to conduct an Affordability 
Analysis and present the results. The Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM) following 
the DAB reflects the analysis by placing affordability constraints on the program, which will 
be tracked to verify that the long-term spending plans of the Service remain affordable. 
Affordability Analysis was formally mandated in the latest version of Department of Defense 
Instruction (DoDI) 5000.02 in January 2015. 
Affordability Analysis is an exercise in which the entire spending of the Service is 
projected over the lifetime of the program in question, usually in excess of 25 years. All 
other projected spending in the Service should leave space for the program in question 
under the expected top line, and the purpose of the analysis is to measure that space. Once 
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that space is determined, many assumptions are made to generate two simple constraints: 
one for investment spending and another for Operations and Support (O&S). Since 2013, 
the responsibility for this analysis has belonged to the Service staffs. Generally, they present 
a “sand chart” that piles all spending by portfolios on top of each other, adding up to the 
expected Service topline, and a second sand chart that shows the expected spending for all 
of the programs in the portfolio that includes the program under consideration. 
In 2009, many programs were ended early, including the Army’s Future Combat 
Systems (FCS), the Marine Corps’ new presidential helicopter, and the Air Force’s F-22 
Raptor—of these, only the F-22 entered service at all. The Honorable Ashton Carter was 
then the USD(AT&L) and the Honorable Frank Kendall III was his principal deputy. Carter 
went on to become Deputy Secretary of Defense in October 2011 and then Secretary of 
Defense in February 2015. Upon Carter’s first promotion, Kendall became acting 
USD(AT&L) and was confirmed in May 2012, where he is today. These two men were the 
original proponents of BBP, the first edition (1.0) signed by Carter and the subsequent ones 
by Kendall. The BBP initiatives have had the backing of the same senior defense team for 
seven years, providing unusual leadership continuity. 
The stated reason for BBP 1.0 was to reduce spending by improving efficiency. An 
additional reason was the idea that future rounds of cancellations like they had just 
experienced should not be repeated, and Affordability Analysis would help prevent it.  
In this paper, we look at what has happened in the years since the DoD began 
mandating Affordability Analysis. So far, although a few programs have been cancelled, 
another wave like 2009’s has not occurred, although another wave so soon would have 
been quite unexpected, regardless of the policy that was followed. There have been some 
other ramifications, and they are the subject of this report. 
An ongoing tension exists within the DoD between programmers and the acquisition 
community, and Affordability Analysis is in the center of it. Programmers consider all 
spending over several years and make all of the pieces fit under the assigned top line in a 
process repeated annually. The USD(AT&L), as the chief acquirer, makes decisions about 
programs individually as they come up sporadically throughout the year. The USD wants to 
prevent having portfolios short on funds because that leads to stretches and cancellations, 
but his tools are decisions for individual programs. Affordability Analysis is an attempt by the 
USD to solve this problem with his tools. 
Most of the research for this paper was conducted using Acquisition Decision 
Memoranda, handouts presented at DABs by program managers, and data archived in the 
Defense Acquisition Management Information Retrieval (DAMIR) System; all are marked 
“For Official Use Only (FOUO).” Consequently, there are very few actual data in this report. 
We do have a larger report that includes all of the data and, as of this writing, the distribution 
rules on it have not yet been set. 
The Goals of Affordability (and Their Evolution) 
Reducing Spending 
The original Memorandum for Acquisition Professionals, Better Buying Power: 
Guidance for Obtaining Greater Efficiency and Productivity in Defense Spending, dated 
September 14, 2010, was signed by Carter and came to be known as BBP 1.0. This section 
begins with a discussion of the vision for affordability expressed in the original memo. It is 
followed by a more lengthy description of the specific guidance therein, with emphasis on 
the establishment of affordability targets and requirements (later changed to affordability 
goals and caps). 
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The 2010 Guidance: BBP 1.0 
BBP 1.0 presented a list of 23 principal actions to improve efficiency in the Defense 
acquisition process. The first five of these actions are associated with the “Target 
Affordability and Control Cost Growth” area. The motivation is stated in the first paragraph of 
the 17-page memo itself: 
To put it bluntly: we have a continuing responsibility to procure the critical 
goods and services our forces need in the years ahead, but we will not have 
the ever-increasing budgets to pay for them. We must therefore strive to 
achieve what economists call productivity growth: in simple terms, to DO 
MORE WITHOUT MORE. … Secretary Gates has directed the Department to 
pursue a wide-ranging Efficiencies Initiative, of which this Guidance is a 
central part. This Guidance affects the approximately $400 billion of the $700 
billion defense budget that is spent annually on contracts for goods … and 
services. … We estimate that the efficiencies targeted by this Guidance can 
make a significant contribution to achieving the $100 billion redirection of 
defense budget dollars from unproductive to more productive purposes that is 
sought … over the next five years. (USD[AT&L], 2010, p. 1) 
We can offer some initial observations based on this guidance. The first is that there 
is no statement of a formal intention to “revolutionize” defense acquisition; the goal is simply 
to achieve a specific amount of cost savings over five years that can be used elsewhere 
within the Department. How these savings or “redirections” are to be measured is left 
unstated. A second observation, which is modified elsewhere in this and later memos, is that 
in the fundamental acquisition tradeoff between cost and requirements, neither is to be 
favored (or sacrificed); instead, these redirections are to be achieved through improved 
efficiency—presumably through better management and oversight.  
The body of the BBP 1.0 memo goes on to direct 23 specific actions, broken into five 
major areas:  
 Target Affordability and Control Cost Growth 
 Incentivize Productivity and Innovation in Industry 
 Promote Real Competition 
 Improve Tradecraft in Services Acquisition 
 Reduce Non-Productive Processes and Bureaucracy 
The first of these five, “Target Affordability and Control Cost Growth,” addresses the 
principal subject of this paper: affordability. The other major areas will not be discussed in 
this document.  
Affordability Vision, Circa 2010 
We begin with the question, “What problem is the affordability approach of BBP 1.0 
intended to address?” This question is not to be asked in a vacuum; it depends on how the 
specific goals of affordability (as expressed in BBP 1.0) differ from other policies and 
oversight mechanisms such as Nunn-McCurdy (N-M) thresholds. The memo offers the 
following definition: “Affordability means conducting a program at a cost constrained by the 
maximum resources the Department can allocate for that capability.”  
One proximate cause that led to BBP 1.0 was the cancellation of a number of 
programs after years of development and billions of dollars expended; chief among these 
was the Army’s Future Combat Systems (FCS). The perception at the highest levels of the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and within the legislative and executive branches 
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of the federal government, was that FCS in particular had been “unaffordable from the start” 
and that this was widely known even at program inception. The cancellation of this program 
was an embarrassment to the Army and to the DoD as a whole. When FCS was a going 
concern, no Affordability Analysis was conducted, and it is conceivable that the Army might 
have made it fit. However, Tate et al. (2007) documented that the costs of FCS would be far 
higher than was in the Army’s plan. So, even if the official cost estimate might have made it 
look affordable, the better estimate would have made it more difficult to fit in the plan.  
The vision of affordability, then—in the context of BBP 1.0—is at least in part to 
“prevent future FCSs.” The unaffordability of FCS seems clear in hindsight, but how does 
one tell which programs that are currently being initiated are likely to become “future FCSs?” 
In general terms, two concepts arose as part of the vision. The first was that the five-
year planning horizon associated with the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) was 
insufficient to prevent initiation of doomed programs: five years does not, in general, even 
cover the development phase of large programs. Since most of the program costs are 
incurred during the Procurement and O&S phases, the costs of these phases must be 
explicitly considered from inception and not pushed off into an out-year “bow wave.” Key 
parts of the guidance, therefore, directed those responsible for managing the programs to 
consider the entire life cycle of the program—30 or 40 years—rather than “just” the FYDP. 
The second concept was that programs should not be considered in isolation, that it 
must be recognized and acknowledged that, in constrained budget environments, cost 
growth in one program will affect the funding available for other programs. This, it was 
argued, must be formally recognized and tied to the question that the program manager 
(PM), the Service, and the OSD should all have in mind: At what point does the cost of a 
program (including the opportunity cost of other systems) exceed its value to the warfighters 
and taxpayers? Complicating matters is the well-known but widely disliked practice of 
stretching out the schedule of troubled programs—as well as programs that are not troubled, 
but that must contend with others that are. This lowers the per-year costs of each of these 
programs—this is the purpose of the practice—but generally increases the total costs and 
delays operational availability. 
BBP 1.0’s Guidance 
BBP 1.0 has five “principal actions” related to the “Target Affordability and Control 
Cost Growth” area: 
 Mandate affordability as a requirement. 
 Drive productivity growth through Will Cost/Should Cost management. 
 Eliminate redundancy within warfighter portfolios. 
 Make production rates economical and hold them stable. 
 Set shorter program timelines and manage to them. 
The principal action mandating affordability gave rise to this paper, and we will look 
at it in depth. The other four mostly are seen as techniques for increasing productivity. We 
will also look at “Eliminate Redundancy Within Warfighter Portfolios” because it is the first 
mention of portfolios and is necessary for understanding how Affordability Analysis is 
conducted. BBP 1.0 also says, 
Requirements and technology level for the [program] will have to fit this 
schedule, not the other way around. When requirements and proposed 
schedules are inconsistent, I will work on an expedited basis with the 
Services and the Joint Staff to modify the requirements as needed before 
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granting authority for the program to proceed. (USD[AT&L], 2010, p. 4) 
[Emphasis in original, and in all cases that follow] 
This is not a focus on making certain that our warfighters have the best stuff 
possible, but rather trading that away to stay on schedule. Trading away requirements 
supports the central mission of BBP 1.0: reducing spending. 
Mandate Affordability as a Requirement  
After presenting the definition of affordability given earlier—“conducting a program at 
a cost constrained by the maximum resources the Department can allocate for that 
capability”—this principal action directs program managers to “treat affordability as a 
requirement before milestone authority [will be granted].” The memo continues: 
Specifically, at Milestone A, my Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM) 
approving formal commencement of the program will contain an affordability 
target to be treated by the program manager (PM) like a Key Performance 
Parameter (KPP) such as speed, power, or data rate—i.e., a design 
parameter not to be sacrificed or compromised without my specific authority. 
At Milestone B, when a system’s detailed design is begun, I will require 
presentation of a systems engineering tradeoff analysis showing how cost 
varies as the major design parameters and time to complete are varied. … 
This analysis would then form the basis of the “Affordability Requirement” that 
would be part of the ADM decision. … this guidance will apply to both 
elements of a program’s life cycle cost—the acquisition cost (typically 30 
percent) and the operating and support cost (typically 70 percent). For 
smaller programs, the CAEs [Component Acquisition Executives]1 will be 
directed to do the same at their level of approval. (USD[AT&L], 2010, p. 2) 
The guidance officially states that the PM must incorporate an affordability target as 
a KPP at the Milestone A DAB. Not stated here, but implied, is that the PM must also 
incorporate an affordability requirement as a KPP at the Milestone B DAB, and beyond.2  
The guidance does not formally state, nor really even hint at, how these affordability 
goals and caps are to be calculated. Many different forms for the constraints were used by 
different programs at DABs, some of which were difficult for OSD to observe, but it has 
become standard for APUC or PAUC to be used to define the constraints when the program 
is buying many units, and total investment to be used for programs in which that is not the 
case.  
Generally, the stated affordability definition—“conducting a program at a cost 
constrained by the maximum resources the Department can allocate for that capability”—
requires that the Services quantify their allowable level of expenditures by capability area 
and fit all the programs in that area within that level. Since costs in a capability area cover 
many programs, tradeoffs must be considered in applying a cap to an individual program. It 
is difficult to answer the questions: At what point does the cost of (for example) a new 
helicopter become so high that you would rather cancel the program and either live with the 
                                            
 
 
1 The Components are the military Services and other agencies. 
2 The terms “target” and “affordability requirement” were later replaced with “goal” and “cap,” 
respectively. 
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old ones, or start over? To what extent would you rather cut back other programs in the 
portfolio? The idea of asking the PM and the Service to think about this before contract 
award is outstanding—but the answer depends on many factors, some of which change 
over time and only some of which are under the PM’s control.  
The requirement to determine and state affordability goals and caps is done to act as 
a trip-wire for cost growth sufficient to require a re-examination of Service priorities and 
available resources. It thus overlaps significantly with N-M reporting. We have no objection 
to this; the target audience is different, and it could prove more useful. 
Eliminate Redundancy Within Warfighter Portfolios  
This action introduces two concepts that are fundamental to the affordability vision. 
The memo text begins with the example of a program that the Army decided to cancel (thus 
freeing up resources for other Army programs) based on the fact that its capabilities could 
be met by other systems. It reads, in part, 
This was a classic value decision that could not have been made by looking 
at the … program in isolation. The Army had to look at the entire “warfighting 
portfolio” … to see that [the program’s cancellation] would not, in fact, result 
in a major sacrifice of military capability. … 
I intend to conduct similar portfolio reviews at the joint and Department-wide 
level with an eye toward identifying redundancies. … I am directing the 
components to do the same for smaller programs and report the results. 
This is the first mention of the term “portfolio” in the Better Buying Power guidance. 
As the concept of affordability evolved, portfolios of families of programs (e.g., “tracked 
vehicles” or “surface ships”) became central. The so-called “sand charts” that must be 
presented in the affordability section of each DAB review are snapshots of these portfolios—
often created by extending out indefinitely the spending in the last year of the FYDP. 
The significance of requiring portfolio information to be presented at DAB reviews is 
not to be underestimated, and it represents something new in the standard OSD Acquisition 
process. Up until this time, the Milestone reviews were between one program manager and 
the appropriate level of acquisition executive, typically USD(AT&L) for Acquisition Category 
(ACAT) I programs. The requirement to discuss interactions with other programs, even if 
superficially, forces the PM to engage with the Service prior to Milestone approval. It should 
not escape notice that a representative of the Service programmer’s office now has a seat at 
ACAT I Milestone reviews, which was not formerly the case.  
Expecting offsets to come from within a single portfolio is less than ideal, but is a 
significant step. The ability to trade not just within but between portfolios, and even between 
Services, is a major theme in the book How Much Is Enough? (Enthoven & Smith, 2006) 
and ought to be. This is especially so because the portfolios used are almost always by 
platform type. For example, trucks and utility helicopters are in different Army portfolios 
(transportation and aviation), and while there are many missions where neither could 
replace the other, on the margins, trades between them might be the best choice. For a 
cross-service example, the Army’s AH-64 Apache helicopters perform similar missions to 
the other Services’ close air support aircraft.  
The 2013 Guidance: BBP 2.0 
The Memorandum Implementation Directive for Better Buying Power 2.0—Achieving 
Greater Efficiency and Productivity in Defense Spending, or BBP 2.0, which was signed by 
Kendall as the Under Secretary on April 24, 2013, incorporates a number of subtle changes 
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with respect to BBP 1.0, dated two-and-a-half years earlier—some detailed changes and 
some important “vision implementation” changes. As this is neither the genesis of 
Affordability Analysis nor current, we treat it with less depth than the other two. There were 
two important changes from this iteration of BBP. 
BBP 2.0 (USD[AT&L], 2013) states, “Constraints stem from long-term affordability 
planning and analysis, which is a Component leadership responsibility.” Explicitly giving the 
setting of constraints to Component leadership was important. Now the Services would have 
ownership of the constraints as well as the USD who signed the ADM, guaranteeing that the 
spending plan brought to the DAB would be approved by Service leadership. Might this have 
helped prevent the FCS debacle? 
Perhaps the most stunning quote in BBP 2.0 (USD[AT&L], 2013) is this: “If 
affordability caps are breached, costs must be reduced or else program cancelation can be 
expected.” This may have been implied before, but in BBP 2.0, this threat became explicit. 
Kendall doubled down on the importance of this initiative. With the costs of breaching so 
clearly high, there might now be pressure not only on the program office to not breach the 
constraints, but also on the OSD, which might also feel compelled to not report a breach to 
prevent having to conduct such a severe action, which might not be warranted.3 
In the September–October 2013 issue of Defense AT&L, Chad Ohlandt, a 
researcher at RAND then serving on a detail at the Acquisition Policy Analysis Center in 
AT&L, published an article called “Dispelling the Myths of DoD’s Affordability Policy.” The 
five-page article lays out in very broad terms what the Services are supposed to do and 
why. He wrote that “Affordability is all about using that knowledge to avoid starting or 
continuing programs that we cannot reasonably expect to pay for in the future.” The timing 
of this article suggests that there were still questions within the acquisition community about 
the purpose of Affordability Analysis and how to do it.  
New Priority: Technological Superiority 
By 2015, Kendall’s focus had shifted somewhat. Using funds efficiently was still 
important, but he was also concerned about technological dominance, and said so in BBP 
3.0. 
The 2015 Guidance: BBP 3.0 
The memo Implementation Directive for Better Buying Power 3.0—Achieving 
Dominant Capabilities Through Technical Excellence and Innovation, henceforth referred to 
as BBP 3.0, was signed by Kendall on April 9, 2015. While the commitment to affordability 
remained, the tone changed significantly.  
As was the case with BBP 2.0, BBP 3.0 (USD[AT&L], 2015) is brief—this time only a 
single page. It is accompanied by two attachments: a one-page Summary Page, and a 33-
page attachment called “Better Buying Power 3.0 Implementation Guidance.” We will again 
discuss three parts of this memo, although it will be a slightly different aggregation: the one-
page memo itself, the one-page Implementation Guidance “Overview,” and the half-page 
section of the Implementation Guidance that specifically refers to affordability. 
                                            
 
 
3 We expect most parents recall making a threat that had to yield compliance … only to find 
themselves holding the pieces of a broken antique dish and now having to decide if they really are 
going to cancel the family vacation. 
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BBP 3.0 Memo Body 
In this memorandum, Kendall writes, “There is more continuity than change in Better 
Buying Power 3.0. Core initiatives focus on: ensuring that the programs we pursue are 
affordable. … We will continue all of these efforts.” 
On one hand, all of the guidance about the importance of maintaining long-term 
affordability, via requirements reduction if necessary, still remains in place: “New in Better 
Buying Power 3.0 is a stronger emphasis on innovation, technical excellence, and the 
quality of our products.” Here we see the emphasis on innovation, which is likely to 
discourage trading capability for affordability. With less trading, there might be more cost 
growth. Furthermore, an emphasis on innovation will lead to more ambitious programs that 
are more likely to yield cost growth. Cost growth from either source would squeeze other 
programs and can lead to unaffordable portfolios. On the other hand, ambitious programs 
sometimes fail, and if they are canceled they can open up affordability space as well. 
BBP 3.0 Implementation Guidance: Overview 
The Overview, page 1 of the Implementation Guidance, states, 
The theme that ties the content of BBP 3.0 together is an overriding concern 
that our technological superiority is at risk. Potential adversaries are 
challenging the U.S. lead in conventional military capability in ways not seen 
since the Cold War. Our technological superiority is based on the 
effectiveness of our research and development efforts. 
Previously, the emphasis had been on reducing spending. This guidance is new. 
BBP 3.0 Implementation Guidance: Achieve Affordable Programs 
While there is a new focus in BBP 3.0, much of the guidance on affordability remains 
the same. Perhaps the most important change is, again, in tone: “ACAT I programs 
projected to exceed approved caps will undergo a Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE) 
review to determine appropriate corrective action” (Implementation Guidance, p. 2).The USD 
has not given up the possibility of cancelling programs that exceed their affordability 
constraints, but the apparent stakes have been lowered considerably. 
Formal Guidance: DoDI 5000.02 
In January 2015, Kendall signed DoD Instruction (DoDI) 5000.02, Operation of the 
Defense Acquisition System. It is consistent with BBP 3.0 and codifies that all of the 
affordability work that had been done before is now required along with many other changes 
to the process. The new instruction has a five-page enclosure entitled “Affordability Analysis 
and Investment Constraints,” which explains in some detail how Affordability Analysis should 
be conducted. It also contains a simple example of calculating a constraint for a fleet of 
trucks when it is assumed that the budget, inventory, capability, and unit cost all will be 
constant for the foreseeable future. 
The Accomplishments of Affordability 
Currently, a little more than a third of active acquisition programs have an 
affordability constraint, which implies that a complete Affordability Analysis was conducted. 
Those that do not have one are older programs and therefore have not been through a DAB 
recently. Most are post Milestone C and have been in production for a while. 
The most common form of affordability constraint is a limit on Average Procurement 
Unit Cost (APUC). The next most common form limits Program Acquisition Unit Cost 
(PAUC). When BBP 2.0 was signed in April 2013 (discussed previously), responsibility for 
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conducting the Affordability Analysis and creating constraints was explicitly given to the 
Services (BBP 1.0 did not indicate who was to be responsible for this). In the early days, 
affordability metrics were sometimes based on many other metrics, such as “unit recurring 
flyaway cost” in one specified year and “Average Ship Acquisition Cost.” Most programs now 
have metrics—discussed later in the Affordability Metrics section—that can be easily 
checked against a value reported in the annual Selected Acquisition Report (SAR), usually 
APUC, PAUC, or total investment.  
This brings us, finally, to the fundamental question: To what degree have actual 
ACAT I programs adjusted their plans as a result of the affordability initiatives? The answer 
is: probably “a bit,” but it is difficult to tell. 
The obvious place to look for the effect of Affordability Analysis is in requirements 
documents. We did look, and found no evidence that they were influenced by affordability 
constraints. We were unable to find any requirements documents written over the last five 
years in which a requirement was relaxed and was clearly done to make a program 
affordable. We also did not hear such stories from our interviews with members of the 
acquisition community; what we did hear were accounts of programs that changed how they 
met requirements or bought hardware. The biggest change we noted was the role of the 
Service programmers, often called “the 8s”4 in the acquisition process.  
While changes to constraints were fairly easy to find, changes to programs were 
much harder, for two reasons. First, the barrier between the Services and OSD precludes 
insight into how the Services, and the Program Offices, have actually reacted to the 
affordability guidance presented in BBP 1.0. Second, there are many factors that separate 
programs that stay on track from those that do not. These include contractor competence, 
program manager talent, number and magnitude of technical challenges, stability of funding, 
stability of requirements, and a variety of unknown unknowns—all in addition to affordability 
guidance. It is difficult for the OSD to sort out these effects. 
Changing Constraints 
If constraints change too easily, then they are not constraining. Kendall has said that 
he will modify affordability constraints if there is a change in quantity, so we wanted to see 
how often affordability constraints changed. While there is an official list of affordability 
constraints in DAMIR, that file does not include changes, only those that are currently in 
force. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (Acquisition Resources and Analysis) kindly 
gave us a spreadsheet that tracks all constraints ever levied. That file showed that there are 
17 programs that have had their affordability constraints changed. 
Of these 17, only four had one binding cap changed for another, as opposed to a 
non-binding goal replaced by either a new goal or cap. The four caps all changed on the 
same day in 2015. One of these four programs had suffered significant cost growth but was 
also deemed to be important enough to warrant a higher cap. One ADM raised the cap for 
that program and lowered the caps for three others in the same Service portfolio. 
                                            
 
 
4 “The 8s” refers to the Army’s G8, the Air Force’s A8, and the Navy’s N8. Each of those is an office 
on the Service staff that programs funds over multiple years. The Navy’s N8 has delegated their role 
at DABs to N2/N6 or N9 for most programs; these offices also take a long view of their portfolios. 
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We do not know what underlying analysis went into these new caps. The ADMs that 
we read (all marked FOUO and therefore not publicly available) only show what the new and 
old caps were; we could not see if meeting the new constraints yielded a portfolio that was 
just as affordable as meeting the old constraints, because the constraints were in different 
base years and each constraint was associated with a different spending profile. Our 
experience suggests that these calculations were done by a staff member at the Service 
and were accepted by the OSD after some scrutiny. Still, this clearly shows that the OSD 
and the Service were thinking about affordability in terms of a portfolio of programs and not 
one program at a time. 
Bringing in the Service Programmers 
The new affordability mandates have brought representatives of the Service 
programming offices to the table for Milestone reviews. This has improved the 
communication between the programmers and the acquisition communities inside the 
Services. The long-term spending plans presented at a DAB in the past may not have been 
seen by the Service’s programmer. Making the Services responsible for “owning” 
affordability forces the PMs and the programmers to interact on these issues far more than 
they have in the past. 
Every year the DoD sends the SARs (prepared by program offices) and the 
President’s Budget (PB; prepared by the Service programmers) to the Congress. Within the 
FYDP, these must agree. However, for years beyond the FYDP, there can be significant 
disagreement between what the two documents say. For example, both the F-35 and Joint 
Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) programs show discrepancies between the December 2014 
SAR submission and the January 2015 PB submission. In the 2016 budget submission, the 
Navy reported total costs for the F-35C carrier variant of $55.66 billion and for the F-35B 
short take off and vertical landing variant of $47.66 billion, for a total of $103.32 billion over 
the life of the program. The December 2014 SAR lists the combined total at $86.8 billion. 
These numbers clearly show that even in the era of Affordability Analysis, the N8 that wrote 
the budget submission and the program office that wrote the SAR were not on the same 
page. Affordability Analysis will not fix that annual problem, but it does require agreement at 
DABs when both groups are in the room. 
Affordability Analysis also demands longer term planning from the programmers. 
Before Affordability Analysis, only the five years in the FYDP received significant focus. Now 
they are required to plan over longer durations. The Army has a new tool called the Long 
Range Investment Requirements Analysis (LIRA), which they use for this purpose. LIRA 
tracks planned Army expenditures over many years, which is exactly what Kendall has 
required. Unfortunately for the OSD, the G8 has stated that the Army does not intend to 
grant access to LIRA to any other organization—this system is for Army internal use only, 
which means that while the OSD can look at the results of the Army’s long-term studies, 
unlike with the FYDP, they will not be able to verify or validate the models or their inputs. We 
believe the other Services have similar systems and similar concerns about sharing data. 
Ground Combat Vehicle 
In 2011, the Army’s Ground Combat Vehicle received Milestone A authority but no 
affordability constraint, and it appeared in PB 2014. But the program went no further in the 
acquisition process. The vehicle they planned to buy was longer and heavier than had been 
anticipated, which likely would have presented significant operational difficulties. However, 
affordability was also a problem, as it would have needed more than half of the expected 
funds in the combat vehicles portfolio. That this program went no further is a success for 
which Affordability Analysis can claim at least partial credit. 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ãW=
`êÉ~íáåÖ=póåÉêÖó=Ñçê=fåÑçêãÉÇ=`Ü~åÖÉ= - 128 - 
Management Considerations 
To make Affordability Analysis as useful as possible, there are several factors that 
need to be thought through. While it has already yielded some wins for the DoD, as 
discussed previously, we think some improvements could be made. We also want to 
highlight what is working well. 
Affordability and Cost Estimates 
The relationship between the affordability of a program and the cost estimates of the 
programs in its portfolio should be considered. Affordability constraints are not cost 
estimates, and for any program that is going forward, the constraint must be greater than or 
equal to the cost estimate—otherwise it ought not to proceed. However, what cost data 
should be used for the other programs in the affordability analysis? A program can become 
unaffordable because cost estimates have risen for other programs in its portfolio. 
Consider new program A which will be in a portfolio with incumbent programs Z, Y, 
and X. Each incumbent program has a cost estimate that should be in their SARs and 
budget submissions, but also an affordability constraint that is higher. Should A’s target 
assume that Z, Y, and X each stay within their cost estimates or that they float up closer to 
their affordability targets? If only cost estimates are used, programs could see cost rises that 
make the portfolio unaffordable without any one exceeding its constraint. However, if the 
affordability targets are assumed, the space for program A is smaller and the difference 
between the cost estimates and the affordability constraints might be seen as a “slush fund” 
to be taken away from the portfolio. So far, it seems, the Services are assuming that all 
programs in the portfolio will stick to the cost estimates when doing their affordability 
analyses, making it possible that all programs could remain under their constraints and still 
yield an unaffordable portfolio. 
Affordability Metrics 
Affordability metrics should be designed so that the USD can be notified when 
something is happening that requires his attention but—as long as the program does not 
threaten the portfolio’s affordability—allows it to continue without his involvement. 
Investment Metrics 
One natural way to make an affordability constraint would be to say that the Service 
may spend no more than Xj on the program in each year  from the present to the expected 
end of the program. This sequence of numbers is what a detailed Affordability Analysis 
yields. However, this has never been used and there are at least two reasons this ought not 
to be adopted. First, such a requirement would take away much discretion in future years. 
There may be good reasons to increase the spending in one year and decrease it in 
another: perhaps to get the capability in the field sooner or simply as a trade to increase 
efficiency by buying at a higher rate. Historically, this discretion has belonged to the 
Services, and Kendall has not suggested that he wants to take it away. Another reason not 
to adopt this requirement is that it is complicated to state. Kendall wants to describe the 
affordability constraint simply in an ADM, and while he has used tables with three numbers 
for the F-35, this approach would require a table with as many as 40 numbers in it, which 
might be unwieldy. 
One simplification would be maximum annual obligations. The ADM would say, “This 
program may not exceed  dollars in any given year.” This relates to affordability; as long as 
the annual obligations stay low, other programs will also be affordable. Because program 
funding generally is not flat, in some years the cap would be higher than the available 
dollars, but that would be sorted out by the Service programmers. Unfortunately, this metric 
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not only allows stretches and increases to total cost, it practically demands them when there 
are cost problems. While this does relate to affordability, it is likely to be counterproductive. 
As discussed earlier, AT&L and the Services have largely settled on the use of the 
APUC or PAUC5 as the metric of choice for most programs because they can track it 
annually when the SARs are written. Also in use are metrics based on total investment or 
total procurement dollars. Typically, metrics based on totals are used for programs such as 
the GPS Operational Control System (OCX) or Space Fence, where the program is buying a 
single capability—not some integer number of identical (or more often similar) items like 
ships, missiles, or ground vehicles. Total expenditure metrics are also easily tracked by the 
SARs. 
The primary problem with APUC and PAUC is that they are not closely related to 
affordability. If a Service has a problem with affordability, they can reduce the number of 
units they plan to buy or stretch the buy over more years. Either choice will decrease the 
costs in each year, making the portfolios more affordable. At the same time, these actions 
increase unit cost. While this appears to be a “bug,” it is actually a “feature.” It means that 
the USD will be alerted and forced to act when the Service makes a decision that increases 
unit costs in order to make a program fit in the budget. 
A weakness of unit cost is that even for programs that are buying many units, the 
definition of “one” is not always clear. For example, the Army’s ATIRCM/CMWS5F6 program 
bought two different systems for the protection of helicopters. Some “units” were only 
CMWS systems and others included both. They also had some other accounting choices 
that affected unit cost (Balaban et al., 2010). The Navy’s Integrated Defensive Electronic 
Countermeasures (IDECM) program is similar, with different “blocks” all included together. 
Some of the “units” include avionics systems and others include only replaceable decoys. In 
the Air Force’s Global Hawk program, each unit was a single remotely piloted aircraft, so 
counting units was fairly straightforward, but the prices varied significantly from one variant 
to another because the payloads were very different, and some payloads were included in 
the Global Hawk program and others were not. It is not uncommon for the program office to 
be able to change the mix of what it plans to buy, which may make the unit cost look 
favorable even as costs rise.  
Total expenditure metrics are similar to unit cost, but without the units in the 
denominator. Stretching the program has the same effect here as it does in unit costs. While 
very few programs that buy integer systems have used these, we think more should 
consider it. This metric has the benefits of average unit cost in that a stretch can trigger an 
affordability breach, but it is also more closely related to affordability. A drawback to total 
                                            
 
 
5 APUC is the total procurement dollars in a base year divided by the total number of production units. 
PAUC is the total dollars in the program (RDT&E plus procurement) divided by the total number of 
units. Both metrics are set in Acquisition Program Baselines (APBs) when programs go through 
milestones. The PAUC and APUC are calculated each year and compared to the APB to determine if 
there is an N-M Breach. Using them for affordability targets introduces another use for these 
numbers. Each year, the PAUC or APUC is compared to the affordability constraint to see if the 
affordability constraint has been breached. 
6 The name ATIRCM/CMWS is a combination of two systems. One system is the Common Missile 
Warning System (CMWS) and the other is the Advanced Threat Infrared Countermeasure (ATIRCM). 
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expenditure is that programs that are successful and have their quantities increased then 
look unaffordable. 
Another interesting consideration regarding choosing between total investments and 
average unit cost is in long-term plans. If the metric used is average unit cost, program 
offices are incentivized to show more and more units going out into the future because these 
units can show increased learning, thereby lowering costs, and they provide more units over 
which to spread development costs. Total investment encourages programs to report fewer 
units into the future. Because the N-M rules already use PAUC and APUC, the combination 
of the N-M rules and affordability rules would provide counter-balancing incentives. 
O&S Metrics 
As the dominant life-cycle cost of most programs, O&S costs are critical to 
maintaining affordability in the broadest sense.  
Maintenance practices have changed significantly in the age of digital electronics, 
composite materials, parts obsolescence, and technology refreshes. We note that the lone 
example of O&S costs in the January 7, 2015, version of DoDI 5000.02 involves a low-tech 
example of a truck program (DoD, 2015). The problem of developing a practical 
methodology for estimating O&S costs for a modern, high-tech program at inception—that 
is, Milestone A—is larger than affordability, but the portfolio’s affordability cannot be 
accurately estimated without estimating the O&S costs.  
To accurately model future O&S costs, one must first be able to accurately determine 
these costs for current programs. Goeller et al. (2014), along with researchers in many other 
organizations, discovered that allocating O&S costs to programs is vastly more difficult than 
assigning RDT&E and Procurement costs, although it is improving. There are a number of 
reasons for this: 
 Commonly, the O&S resources of several programs are combined into a 
single Program Element, making isolation difficult. 
 Often O&S costs of one system—for example, a cruise missile—are actually 
funded out of another program—for example, a B-52 wing.  
 The actual logs of expenditures are not all centrally located, despite large 
efforts to implement programs such as Visibility & Management of Operation 
& Support Cost (VAMOSC) and Air Force Total Ownership Cost (AFTOC). 
 In some cases, maintenance is covered by a warrantee contract with the 
vendor that supplied the system—meaning that the cost to maintain that 
system is not only unknown to the government, it is contractor proprietary. 
This maintenance is funded with procurement dollars rather than Operation & 
Maintenance dollars and can be years away from when the maintenance is 
performed.  
 Even where O&S costs can be isolated by program, the funding often 
represents what the maintenance organization was given—and not what they 
actually needed to satisfy all of their requirements. This problem can go in 
both directions—a plane might fly more hours than required because they 
have the funds or it may fly fewer hours than is considered optimal because 
there were insufficient funds to support more. Actual O&S costs are, in fact, a 
combination of what is required and what is provided. 
All of these problems are being worked on, and even a casual look at the SARs 
today show that the work here is more sophisticated and careful than it was five years ago. 
There are other issues besides difficulty. 
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Placing a requirement on O&S costs for a program in development could provide 
poor incentives to the program office. Because actual costs are likely to be analyzed even 
on prototype hardware, suboptimal decisions about how to operate and test it might be 
made. Perhaps a truck must be tested in sandy conditions, where it is particularly difficult to 
maintain. Because of the high costs associated with this, a PM might feel compelled to run 
another meaningless long test in more benign conditions to lower the measured O&S costs. 
It is not clear what the O&S constraints that have been set will do, and the way they 
are phrased makes them quite different. Some are totals over many years, which would 
provide different incentives than others that are on a per-year basis, so a program could 
meet the constraint in some years and not in others. In any event, once the O&S costs are 
the dominant cost in a program, the USD(AT&L) usually has very little say over the 
program’s future. Would the Under Secretary want a new program started to replace a 
fielded system because the O&S costs are too high? This is unclear. Designing systems 
with an eye toward lower O&S down the road is wise, but it is not at all clear what an 
affordability constraint can accomplish. 
Limits of Affordability Analysis 
Current Bow Wave 
The “bow wave” has been a concern in the Pentagon since at least the Kennedy 
Administration, when Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara’s team created the FYDP to 
extend planning horizons. The FYDP’s “out years” are not a perfect prediction of the future, 
but they do enforce a level of discipline to Service programmers and ensure that there is 
some possible way to continue five years out with the spending plans of today; there cannot 
really be a bow wave within five years, anymore. However, there can be a bow wave 
beyond the FYDP that will cause headaches for programmers when those bills come due; 
Affordability Analysis is intended to reduce that. 
Today, some analysts perceive a large bow wave beyond the FYDP in large part 
because of big programs like the Navy’s new ballistic missile submarines and the Air Force’s 
long range strike bomber (LRSB; Gertler, 2015; Hale, 2016). In an ideal world, Affordability 
Analysis would make this bow wave impossible. These programs are both in the early 
stages, meaning there is significant uncertainty, but they are likely to be expensive. We will 
not assert that this proves Affordability Analysis has failed, but were Affordability Analysis 
not in use, the bow wave might be worse. More than half of all acquisition programs still 
have no affordability constraints. Affordability Analysis is a tool that may make the bow wave 
easier to deal with over time. 
Affordability Games 
In some ways, the acquisition system is a game, and the laws, regulations, and 
policy are the rules. Affordability Analysis and constraints are new rules, and they have led 
to some gaming by the Services and program offices. The JLTV is one case. 
In Figure 1, the horizontal axis shows cumulative units delivered. Each black circle 
represents an annual lot delivery, and three of them are called out by year to orient the 
reader. The dots and the solid red line show what we call the “Cumulative Average Unit 
Cost.” This is what the program’s APUC would be if the program were executed until that 
point and then terminated. If the 2015 lot were purchased and nothing else, the program’s 
APUC would be $835,000. This is normal; it is expected that the longer the program runs, 
the lower the APUC should be. Two things about this chart are particularly noteworthy. First, 
according to the black dots, the program will not meet the affordability goal set at Milestone 
B unless it continues producing according to plan until at least 2038. Second, starting in 
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2028, for no known reason, the cost estimate starts to fall below the fitted learning curve. 
Without this unexplained decrease, the JLTV would never meet its affordability target. The 
chart may make the differences look small, but in 2040, if the costs each year match the 
learning curve instead of the prediction, the total extra cost would be $300 million over 25 
years. 
 
 JLTV Costs in BY 2012 Dollars Based on the December 2014 SAR 
Estimate 
The most recent PB submissions for JLTV show a significant decrease in cost with a 
new APUC of $333,000. This is probably good news for the Army and taxpayers. We do not 
know if the program has achieved this by finding efficiencies, reducing capability, or merely 
quantifying optimism. This change was not made to satisfy the existing affordability cap, as 
they met that the year before and it did not require a change. It is possible that the Army 
conducted its own internal Affordability Analysis and decided they needed to reduce the cost 
of this program. Whatever the case, it is clear that, for a while, the JLTV program office was 
showing some strange numbers, apparently to keep their program’s costs below the cap 
assigned at Milestone B. 
Innovation and Predictability 
The first two BBP memos were about reducing spending. This is a laudable goal, but 
it cannot be the DoD’s only one. BBP 3.0’s full title includes the words Achieving Dominant 
Capabilities Through Technical Excellence and Innovation—which suggests another focus is 
coming back to the fore: The DoD should be acquiring state-of-the-art systems. Designing 
such systems is inherently difficult and unpredictable; it is also a long-standing American 
tradition. 
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Unfortunately, Affordability Analysis is predicated on knowing costs. Every program 
in the portfolio has a cost estimate. Those estimates are combined with the expected 
budgets to determine how much funding is available for the system under evaluation. If 
those cost estimates are highly uncertain, it is impossible to know how much extra funding is 
available. If any of those programs are pushing the state of the art, it is difficult to know what 
they will cost. FCS may have gone too far, but reaches in the past have yielded excellent 
results, and we need those from time to time. We present a historic system that shows how 
long this problem has been around. 
Ian Toll’s 2008 book, Six Frigates: The Epic History of the Founding of the U.S. 
Navy, tells of the Washington Administration’s program to build six heavy frigates as the 
backbone of a new navy. “The estimated cost of construction, victualling, and three months’ 
pay for officers and crew was $600,000. It was an estimate that would seem preposterous in 
retrospect.” This was a huge sum at the time, dwarfing all federal expenditures other than 
the interest on the enormous national debt that had been accumulated during the War of 
Independence, and then there were huge cost growth and schedule slips besides.  
The program was plagued with many of the issues we see today. Dramatic 
requirements changes—is their purpose to defeat the Barbary Pirates or fight the navies of 
France and Britain? Uneven funding—at one point, the Congress required that the program 
be reduced from six to three ships, but they then changed their minds again. Pork barrel 
spending (before the term was invented)—the six ships were built in six cities, a decision Mr. 
Washington made, knowing that he was trading away efficiency. The ultimate result, 
however, was similarly awesome: warships, including the USS Constitution, that were the 
most capable the world had ever seen. 
We can and will build cutting-edge equipment in the future, and, in contrast to the 
recent past, the current environment is starting to encourage such development again. Even 
if we are always smart, such programs are difficult to predict: Some will cost more than 
expected, some will fail, and some will be tremendous successes. These programs are 
difficult to fit into 40-year models. 
Conclusion 
Affordability Analysis is a useful but limited tool for the OSD to try to make sure the 
Services are planning their acquisitions far into the future. Constraints are a part of that 
process, and allow the USD a rough monitor of the affordability of each Service’s programs 
when they are not undergoing DABs. The direct effects are likely positive but have been 
modest. 
The unexpected success is that this initiative has brought the Service programmers 
into the DABs. Several times in the life of each program, the program manager and his 
“eight” sit in the same room and look at the same long-term spending plan. We believe that 
this is unprecedented and a significant benefit for the Department of Defense. 
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Make production rates economical and hold them stable. 
 
S et shorter program timelines and manage to them. 
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“Target  Affordabil ity and Control  Cost  Growth” was 
the leading area discussed in BBP 1.0 
Affordability Goal – not binding 
 
Affordability C ap – binding post- MS  B  
 
Affordability C onstraint – either one 
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Definit ions 
Implementat ion Direct ive for BBP 2.0 – Achieving Greater 
Eff iciency and Product ivity in Defense Spending 
24 April 2013 
“We are continuing our efforts…to achieve greater 
efficiency and productivity in defense spending.” 
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“If affordability caps are breached, costs 
must be reduced or else program 
cancelation can be expected.” 
- B B P 2.0  
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“Constraints stem from long- term 
affordability planning and analysis , which is  
a C omponent leadership responsibility.” 
- B B P 2.0  
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Presentation of Affordability Analysis became 
standardized after B B P 2.0  
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A Sample Service’s Total  Obl igat ional Authority (TOA) 
4 May 2016 12 
Relevant  Port fol io 
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W hat has affordability accomplished? 
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42 of 105 active programs have constraints 
 
13 have had 2 constraints  
 
4 have had 3 constraints  
 
4 caps (as  opposed to goals) have changed 
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Constraints are not  changed often 
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The Ground Combat  Vehicle 
The Navy N2/ N6 told IDA that  Affordabil ity Analysis 
saved them a lot  of money 
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What are the challenges going forward? 
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Cumulative Units Delivered 
JLTV 
Cumulative Average Unit Cost (DAES 3-25-15 Estimate)
Fit Learning Curve (Based on first 10 Lots)
2012 MS B APUC Affordability Cap ($399k)
Quantity up → APU C  down 
Quantity up → total up 
 
Incentives when using totals   
oppose N unn- McC urdy rules 
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Totals should be considered in more cases, as 
incent ives are reversed against  PAUC or APUC 
Average unit  cost  depends on  
ident ifying equivalent  units 
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Average unit  cost  depends on  
ident ifying equivalent  units 
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Average unit  cost  depends on  
ident ifying equivalent  units 
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Average unit  cost  depends on  
ident ifying equivalent  units 
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Average unit  cost  depends on  
ident ifying equivalent  units 
4 May 2016 32 
Average unit  cost  depends on  
ident ifying equivalent  units 
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Operat ion & Support  constraints are hard to monitor 
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Operat ion & Support  constraints could yield 
bad incent ives 
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Port fol ios are not  stable 
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Constant Currency Units 
  A B C D E F G 
  Dec 2011 Feb 2012 Oct 2012 Aug 2013 Oct 2013 Oct 2013 Sep 2014 
Portfolio 1 119 119   97     99     87 99 
Portfolio 2   89 95   103   91   
Portfolio 3   83   83     77     65   
Portfolio 4   67 65 79   63 63 60 62   
Portfolio 5   56   56     52     46   
Portfolio 6   42 44   44   44 46   
Portfolio 7   30   28     32 28   28   
Portfolio 8   24 34 34 30   22   
Portfolio 9   22   20     26     22   
Portfolio 10   18 18   20   16   
Investment 
Total   550   554     546     482   
Long-Range Planning 
w ith Innovat ion, Uncertainty, Risk 
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The spirit of Affordability Analysis has taken 
hold and yielded fruit 
 
PAU C  is  a good affordability constraint 
…but totals  are better in many c ircumstances 
 
T he current portfolios are not suffic ient 
 
C urrent practice doesn’t account for 
uncertainty 
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Takeaways 
4 May 2016 39 
DAB 
4 May 2016 40  
Backup 
41 4 May 2016 
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Six ships of Battle Force Zulu steam in formation after the cease-fire that 
ended Operation Desert Storm. At left, from top, are the guided missile 
cruiser USS LEYTE GULF (CG-55), the aircraft carriers USS MIDWAY (CV-
41) and USS RANGER (CV-61) and the guided missile cruiser USS 
NORMANDY (CG-60). At right are the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier 
USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT (CVN-71), top, and the aircraft carrier USS 
AMERICA (CV-66) 
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Matt Cavenaugh, one of Joe Montana’s many backups. 
http:/ / www.amazon.com/ Cavanaugh-Autographed-Signed-Francisco-
49ers/ dp/ B00BY6NQSC 
 
 
Pictures from DAMIR are from the “Mission and Description” tab in the SAR from the year posted. 
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19 August 2015 – Army G8, L T C David R ichkowski  
 
20  October 2015 – R AN D Irv B lickstein, Mr. J ohn Y urchak 
and Mr. B radley Martin 
 
3 N ovember 2015 – OS D- PAR CA- APAP, Dr. Philip Antón 
 
16 N ovember 2015 – N avy N 2/ N 6, Mr. S tephen S adler 
 
29 December 2015 – Army G8, COL  Christopher Farrell, 
Mr. B illie W atts , and Mr. Alfred W ilson 
 
14 J anuary 2016 – AT &L - AR A, Mr. J oseph B eauregard 
and Mr. David B awel 
















Special  Thanks 
David Tate 
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Target Affordability and Control C ost Growth 
 
Incentivize Productivity and Innovation in 
Industry 
 
Promote R eal C ompetition 
 
Improve T radecraft in S ervices Acquisition 
 
R educe N on- Productive Processes and 
B ureaucracy 
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The focus of BBP 1.0 was on reducing spending 
B ack 
